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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~rr

ATE 0 t~, LT ~\ 11,

Platuti.ff and Respo·nde-nt 1
Case

--VS.-

) l_.:\ ( 'l\: J.-fERRif J 1-' RTV·E~~RITR.OJ I. ~JR. J
and LEt))J"_._.\J-tl) \V -'\.R.NEJ{ BO.\\:r XE~

Xo~

9089

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Appellant Bowne
STAT·E~:IEN'l, 01~,

FACTS

On the :24-th day of August, 1958~ at approximately
S ;00 p.m., LeRoy Joseph \.r erner vlas killcd4 The decedent.
was an inmate at the l~tah State Prison, and the homicide
occurred at the Prjson in the attic to Cell Block A~ ':rhe
killing 1vas accornplished hy Mack Merrill Rivenburghr
Jr. (R. ~ll~j; T. ~0~~ 553~ 604-613). There v,;-cre t\vo other
inmates present in the attic at the tirne of the killing,
Jesse :JL Garri a, J r4, and thP appellant in this tnattcr ~
Leonard \Varner Bo,·vne.

Earlier that Jay, Itivenburglt had jnformed Bo\\~ne
that he intended to perform an act of ~odotny '\·it h the
decedent. He asked Bo,vne to ~erve as a lookout in the
1
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.

.

.

.

..

attic· d~ri.ng the act of" perversion (R . 269, 270, 319~ 503;
r_l'~ 253,. 5~+-!JSG, 684, and 694). Because of fear 1 ·which
~o,vnc held for Rivenburgh, and the custom of the Prison,
Bo,vne agreed to_ act a~ ~'poin~ man" during the act of
s·odomy. I-'ursuant to· this," Rivenburgh secured some
soiled e:~othing for B~v{n~ ·.0 ""~~ar in the d~sty ~ttic (R.
50:~~ 504 ;_ ~--- 659 )~ Bov~.~~.e. changed into the s~iied el_oth~s,
mP,.gled and. talked 'vit~t ~thcr iruuates i_n the cell bloc1-i
(T .. ~29 and 695 ), and approxjmately one~ half hour later
.entered the attic with Garcia.
Bovlne and Garcia:
were
in the attic about ten minutes
.
.
prior to the arrival of Rivenburgh and the decedent (T.
C3~). ''{bile waiting they talked casually and srnokcd a
eigarette. After Rivenburgh and the dacedent entered
t.he attic, the decedent began to tmd re~ s j n preparation
for the act of sodomy (T. 601 and 602) . Tt V{as dark in
t~te· attie~ Rivenburgh sp~ke to Bo\vne to make sure he
and Ga.rGia were ~~on point,'' and to1rl Bowne to close the
grat~ng Vlhich covered the IJlace
entry (R. 51~; T. 608~

or

G4lt and 698) ..
I~O\\··ne

removed
his shoes
so as to make less noise
.
.
in crossing the metal deck of the atHc (T. 6~7 a~_d 698).
As he passed b~y Rivenburgh he notirA;d the de~-edent und t'es~ing and· also notic~d tha:t .1~-ivenhurgh 1vas holding a
kr.Life 'vhich he frequcntl~v carri-ed (T. S36 and 837).
Rivenburgh and the decedent \vere talking in an incon~
::-ipieiou~ tone, and Bo,vne did not pay any attention to
'vhat 'va~ said (T. 699).
.

.

\ Vltile Bo'\o\rne \ras adjusting the loose grating, he had

his back to Rivenburgh and the decedent. Bowne~heard a

2
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loud s(·r-c·n1n~ pounding on thP metal deck, and a great deal
(1 r noi~e \\'hich ~l'l'ltH.'d to Indicate an intensiYC struggle
bet1veen HivPnburgh and the decedent (T. 700 and 736).
Rivenburgh eri~·d out. lie had lost his knife, and he asked
llH' ~u\1 p in finding it. ( r1
701; see also T4 607 and 611)4
1

..

q ovL\t·ued by instinct and fear, Bo'\\yne opened a
pocket-knife \Vhich he carried with him ( T. 701 and TO~)
l "pon quick refleeti on, l~o\\. ne closed the knife and returned it to his poeket (T. 703). He fell on his }nl.-:l~ls
and knees and attempted to find the knife lost hy Rivenlnlrgh ( T. 701). In tlris position Bo,vne V{as severely en t
in the upper portion of his leg, although at no time did
i1e join the struggle or muke an)~ ph·ysi cal contact \vi lh
the decedent {T. 704). 'Vhile looking for the knife,
Bo,vne felt something 'val'tn and sticky \vhich later proved
to be blood (T. 703 )~
I

Rivenburgh fled the scene; running to the oppositP end of the attic, he descended to the catwalk belo'\r.
Garcia follo\\~ed J{i venburgh, and Bovm.e, after having
some difficulty finding his shoes} came out of the attic

last ( T~ 705). In the excitement, Bo,vne had gained pos~<.~ssion of two knives which he brought out of the attic
(T~ 706 and 707)..
·
·
The three \\'l th the help of other inmates cle.arted
themselves, disposed of the bloody clothing, and established ali bj s ( R. :2-JG~ 2G.S; T. 229-24:~~ 707 ~ 710). Son1etjme
later J~owru_~ concluded that the decedent had been killed
(T. 772). ~.:\ t no time did Bo\vne take part in any plait
to kill the decedent, or entertain any intent to !rill {T~ G4~.
645, 699~ 703-706, 710).
'
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Of course there was rnucl1 conflicting evidence, and
the ~tate 'vill rely Oil facts :::;onie'\vhat different than the
essential clements we have set forth above. There \Vas
testimony concerning a conversation betV~oTeen Rivenburgh
and another jn1nate, Randel, \vhich took place on the 24th
of August prior to the ho1nicide. l~o";rne ¥las present as
the other tv{o iliscussed the druggerl C.Oilrlit.ion of the decedent. The decedent, as "'""ell a~ the other in•nates in~
volved, including the \vitnesses for the State, had taken
exef.~sive arnounts of amphetimine pills over a period
of days prior to the homicide. During this conversation
l{ivenburgh rernarkcd tltat ~omebody \Vas going to cut
off the decedent's head if he continued to act as he had
( R. 497 ; r_r ~ 221-223, and 691). rrh Is led 1t i ven burgh and
R.andel to a general discussion of various methods of
homicide ( T. :245 and 246). Bovill e did not pay particular
attention to \Vhat vir as said, since such talk 1vas co1nn1on
}Jlace at the Prison (R. 276-~78~ :2DG, 297, 497; T~ 691 and
r \9.:2) . Indulging in a1nphetimine~ and ot1te r drugs, po~
sessing knive:.-:;, thrt~atcning death, and engaging in acts
of sodon1y \\rcre not unusual act ivilies for inmates of the
L~ta.h State PJ'isOTI at this ti tne------..-espec.ially Rivenburgh
(R.. 233~~38, 281-283, 285-~SD, 4SS-495, 500, 501, 510; ~r.
~51, ~~3.:!~ 609, and 610 ).

(;arcia was tried 8eparately. Rivenburgh and the
appellant Bo\vne 1vere tried jointly and convicted of
•nurder in the first degree . The detailed testirnor.y introduced supports all of the~e facts..
e \vill refer to the
dc~tail~ of the testirr1ony as the·~· betou1e applir.able in
.stating out· argument~.

''T

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I.
f'TA.H COD.8"' A~..VN. § 77-30-2 (1953) IS UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL+
TliF. DEFENDA ~T Vl AS DENIED DUE PROCESS
OF LAW IK THAT UT..4H CODE ANN. § ii-.30-2 (1953) IS
VIOLATIVE OF' THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAll, ART. II§ 7~
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.Z~JITED STATES,
AMEND~ "'\IV+

A.

ll. THE DEF.EI\'D.AKT \VAS DE~IED THE RIGHT 'TO
A FAIR A~D I11PARTL-\.L JCRY IN THAT [.ITAH CODE
A~v~v. ~ 7'7-30~'2

(195J) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE COtVSTITUTlON OF UTAHt ART~ I, § 12.

C. THE DEFENDA)JT WAS DE~IED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LA\VS TK THAT .[JTAH CODE A:.\~~v.
§ 77-.J0-:2 (1953) IS VIOLATI""lE OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED ST. .4..T~'S, AMEND. XIV+
POINT IL

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
NOT GRANTING DEFEND ..~NT~S !\'lOTION FOR A SEPA.
RATE TRIAL~

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFE~DANT'S J\.IOTION TO DlS}I11SS SIN·CE THE Jl~RY

COULD NOT HAVE FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF I\·IUR-

DER.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S I~STRUCTION NO . 15 IS CONFeSI~G AND IN ERROR RECAL~SE IT FAILS 'TO SEP~\·
R~-\ TE THE CRIME OF SOD011Y FROM THE CRI:VIE OF

5
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}fURDER, AND IN ITS ABSTRA·CT· FORA! COULD ALLOW
THE JURY TO FIND THE DE.FENDANT GUILTY OF
1\iURDER IF THEY BELIEVED HE AIDED AND ABETTED
IN THE A-cT OF SODOMY.
.
~

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT~S INSTRUCTION NO+ 26 IS IN
J!.:RROR SINCE IT FAILS TO RESTRICT THE JURY TO A
CONSIDERATION OF THE ADJ1.liSSIONS AND STIPULA·
TIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE TRIAL-TO EACH
RESPECTIVE PARTY.
POINT VL
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO~ 13.
.
.

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL~
~

•.

POINT VIII.
· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO C01tlPEL
T.HE PROSECUTIO~ TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS
.AND· .COPIES OF STATEMENTS l\iADE BY WITNESSES

AND

DEFENDANTS~

-

.

.....

. .. .

POINT IX ..
..

.

TfiE TRIAL COURT ERRED WH~N IT REFUSED TO
AD~IIT EVIDENCE
CONCERNING
THE CHARACTER AND
. .
.
REPUTATION OF THE DECEASED .
~

..... . .

-

...

...

..... .

. . . ·.

..

.. ·

··~

.

•

•

_.

·, •

•

•'.

~
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POINT l.
UTAH CODE A;VlV. § 7'1"-.'10-2 (1953) IS UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL.
A+ THE DEFENDANT \V..:\S DENIED DUE PROCESS
OF LAW I~ THAT UTAH CODE f"L~•.llv'. § 77-90-2 (1953) IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF U'TAH 1 ART. 1,. § 7~
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE Uh'ITED STATES.
A.JfE1\rD+ XIV+

B. THE DEFENDA~T WAS DENIED THE RIGHT ITO
A FAIR AND IIVIPARTIAL JL~RY IN THAT UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITU~
TION OF liTAHJ ART. I~ § 12.

C. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT ·UTAH CODE AlVl~l.
§ 77~80-2 (1958) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTJ01.V
OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND. XIV .
l~tah

Code Ann. =~ 7'1"-30-15 (1953)~ which allo\vs a
person charged \Vi tl 1 a eri rne to exe rei se certain pe rernptor~y challenges, reads as follows:

HThe state and defendant shall each be allo\ved the follo·w·ing num her of peremptory cha1~
Jrnge~:

(a) Ten, if the offenf.!e charged is pillljs]lable
by death.
(b) Four, if the offense charged i8 a felony
not punishahlP hy death.
(c) Three, if the offense charged is a tnisdem-eanor.~'

In the event of a joint triaL tb [s section js modified bY
the provisions of l Ttah Code . .4 nn. § 77-.10-2 (1953), Vlhich
.

~tates:

7
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w

~"If

t-w·o or 1nore defendants are jointly tried
they sha11 eollectively be allo1ved the number of
p (~rempt o ry c.ha11 en ge s specified in section 77.3015 OTJly in case they join jn. ~uch collective challenges, but in addition to ~ u{·h challenges each
defendant shall be allo"\ved the follo\ving number
of perernptOIJ challenge~ "\\Thich may be separate] y exercised :
7

(a) T"'\\'o, if the olTen~c cl1arged is punishable
by death.

(b) One, if the offense charged
able by death.'~

h~

not punish-

The t\VO defendants in the irl~tant ease eould not
agree upon the ten peren11)to•·:f challenges allo'\ved in
section 7?-30&15 or any or thenl
64 and 65 ). l-nder
the ternls of section 77-30-2, each defendant \Vonld be entitled to exercise only t\vo pe ren1pto ry challenges. \\ ·i th
this in mind, the defendant Bo1vne conditionally agreed
to the selections of defendant Rivenburg- in order that
the defendant Rivenburg \\'ould not be denied his full
llUlnbcr of percrnptury challenges {rp. 64 and 65). This
\~·as done \Vith the approval or the trial jndge on the expres~ understanding that the defendant Bo,vne v.rould
not thereby saer i [i(·e his objections to the section or 'vaive
any right to appeal the question to this Court (T. 65).

cr.

tried jointly and could not
agree upon any of the challenges 'vi th the other defendSince the defendant "\vas

ant~

he \vas re~tricted io only t"\\To peremptory challenges.
Even a del'endant charged \Yith a misdemr.anor is entitled
to t.h rc.~l~ J.lCTl~ ut pt o t·y (· hallengr~~- (} tah Code Au n. § 77.:i0-.15 (.1953). rl,o allo\r a defendant ''"ho is rltarged with
an offt·nse puni~hable hy death only t-wo ~ueh challenges

8
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is certainly unju~t, unfair, and violative of the due process p1·ovisions of our L~onst i tn tions. z.-: tah Co·u-st., a.r t. I 1 ~
'7; Const . , amend. XIV . Such a l'esult violates our tradi~
tion al concepts of fair play and substantial justice, and
denies the defendant a trial by a fair and impartial jury.
li tah Const., art. I, ~ 1:2.
que~tion

'vas first raised in Utah in the case
of People v . O'La·ughlin, 3 T:tah 133, 1 Pac. 653 (1882).
At that time Utah \va.s a territory~ but the statute in question had the same effect as section 77~30-2. The court
revie-..ved the argument of the counsel for the defense as
folol\vs:
This

~'

[Counsel for the defense argued] that in
criminal cases each defendant must plead for himself in person ; each makes a separa.te is sue \vith
the people on the question of his guilt. If convicted, each must suffer punishment for himself,
or each n1ay be pardoned on his own merits. One
can appeal "ri thout aff eeting an other. In all this,
it is elaitned, tl1ere is a distinction between crimi-~
nal and civil cases. In a civil case one judgment
only is recorded; one satisfaction pays for all;
and the ref ore, in a criminal case the trial is nece ssarily separate, to a certain extent; in other
''+ords, the \Vo rd 'party' as used in the statute,
means each individual defendant.'~ (Id . at 1 Pac.
655)
The court reje<:ted the defendant's argument that each
defendant was entitled to exercise the full number of peremptories and held that the challenges had to be exer~
cised jointly. The reasoning behind this interpretation
was stated as follows:
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·t•Jiy the statu~e riot js n1ade a felony, and section 262 of the cri1ninal proc.edure act gives to any
defendant jointly indicted 'vith another or others,
for a· felony, the right to a separate tria.J, if he
requires it. All the defendants having waived this
privilege and declared their election to be tried
jointly, their defense 'v~ joint and not several,
and no one of them had authority to control the
con~uct of the defense." (Id. at 1 Pac. 656)
F:rom 1878 until 1935, L~tah had a statute 1vhlch e·ntitled. any person charged \V1 th a felony to a separate
triaL Section 105~32-6 of the Revised Statutes of 1933

read as follo-,.vs :
~~\Vhen two o:r more defendants are jointly
charged with a felony any defendant requiring it
must be tried separately. In other cases the defefldants jojntly charged 1nay be tried separately
or jointly in the discretion of the court."

See also Grim. Pra-c . Act of J,>;·s) § :262~ p . 116; C. L.
§ 5038 {1888); 11.6... § 4850 (1898); G,. L. § 4850 ( 1 :;o7);
C~L.

§

~i980 ( 1917).

·

\Vhen a defendant had the right to demand a separa~e·_triaJ, ~e provisions of. s~~tio:n 77-30-2 ,\-ere not o~
jection.able. If a joint. def ~nd~nt did. not agree ,\~i th. th~
.other defendants as to the exercise of the chal~e11:ges. ~Qen
he could detnand a separate trial, and thus take advantage of th_c. full number of chall~~ges allo,ved by sec~ion
77-30~15.

'vas ~Inend
ed to read substantially the same as {/t.ah Code Ann. (~
77-3J-6 · (1953). .Fro1n tha_t tbne t111til the present date,

On l\Iarch

14~

1935,

se(~~ion 105~32-6

n joint defendant has had no right to dernand a separate

10
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trial. A separate trial may only be gl'an ted in the di~tre~
tion of the trial judge. ''rhen there is no way in "-l1irh a
defendant can as~ure himself of the full number of perr·nlptory ehallenges granted by section 77-30-.1 s, section
77 ~.'}0-~ 1 requiring the challenges to be exercised jointly,
becomes objectionable and unconstitutionaL
In Ca-rro/.l -~;. S ta.tef 139 Fla.
the court stated a~ follo,vs:

2:3~)~

190 So. 437 ( 1939),

~·t1 nder

the Constitution of the U-nited States
and the State of F~lorida the defendant in a criminal ca8e i~ guaranteed the right to a trial b)' an
impartial jury and it is to effectuate this guaranty
that he 1nay rejPr.t a certain nurnber of thoRe ~7 ho
are called to the jury box without. giving his
reason for not 1vishing then1 to pass upon his guilt
or innocence. By tl~i~ n1eans he may esr..ape the
judg1nent of those ,,-hout he may consider prejudicial agaiilSt hin1 but 'vhom he may· not be able
to ;sh(nv disqualified for causes defined by statute/~ (Id. at 190 So. 438)
,
See also ill eade r. ('I tate. H5 So. 2d 613 (Fla . 1956) .

There are cases to the effect that peremptory chal~
lenges are 'Within the discretion of the legislature.· These
cases hold that the rc is ·no constitutional 1·ight to a peremptory challenge RR contrasted with a challenge· for
cause. Even if thi~ view is taken, section 77-.10_,_·2 is unconstitutional in that it denied the defendant the equal
protection of the la\v. Co·u,'·d., n·n~e nd. XIV.
Vlhen the legislature has provided for perf!..mptory
ehall enges, as the t ~ tah Iegisla ture has in section 77-JO-

11
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every bit as real

created hy the Con~titution come into beingr The lTtah legh;lature "\Vent
J'ul"ther, hovlevcr, and in section 77-30-2 it restricted the
rig-ht to peremptory challenges ''"'hieh a defendant tried

1.5j rights

as these

jointly might have~ In other v.rordsJ section 77-30-2 dif~
ferentiutes bet\veen tvv-o types of defendants one of \vhich
.i~ excluded fro1n the sub~tantive provisions of se(~.t.ion
'17-30~15. The effect of this ~ection is to diserhuinate
against any joint defendant ,,~ho cannot agree 'vith the
others. Such discrimination is unreasonable and ar bitrary and renders sP.rt!on 77-80-2 unconstitutional.
.In State v . Jf ason, 94 T; tah 501 1 78 P r2d 920 ( 1938),

J u~~t.ice \~~l olfe set forth the proper standard -with which
to detcrrnine the conHtitutionalit;.~ of an act 'vhich is questhe equal protc~t1on of the Ja·ws. In
doing so he 1nade the foil O\ving cornrncnts:

tioned as

denyin~

"~~ denial of the 1a'.\'~ equal IJ rotecti ou presupposes an unreasonable di:.;(·.rim ina t.i on bet\re.en
tl1ose included and those excluded from the act
\vhether the act confers a privilege or a right or
im}>oses a duty or an obligation.

''Of course, every legislative act is in one
sense discriminatory.. The legislature can not 1egj slate as to all persons or all subject matters~ lt is
inelns i ve a~ to sou! c <~la~~ or group a11 d a~ to some
lnunan 1'elationRhips, tran~aetions, or functions
rtnd exclusive a~ to the ren1ainder. For that
reason, to be rmconstitu tional the discrimination
1n11 ~ t be un r<._"'a~oua h l {_"' or ar bitrar~~~ ~:\. clas~ ifieat i un is lH:ver u n reaHon a 1de or a rh1 trar_\~ in its incl u~ion or exclusion features so long as there is
~n1ue basis for the differentiation bet,\-een classes

12
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or subject nlatt.ers in~luded as compared to tl1o~e
excluded i"rotu it~ operation~ provided the differ~
cntiation bear~ a reasonable relation to the purposes to be aerornplished hy the act.
''It is only where son1e person::3 or .transactions excl nded from the operation of the In\,. are
as to the subject matter of the la\v in no djfferentiable f·lass fro1n tho~.P ineluded in its operation
that the la\f is discrirninatory in the ~e11~e of
lH~ing arbitrary and uneonsli tutional.. If a reasonable basis to diffetentiate those included fro1n
those excluded from its operation can be found, it
must be held constitutionaL"

The legislature's purpose in enacting section ·77~30-15
is obvious. The purpose behind section 77~30-2, \vhich
restricts the operation of ;7 <~Y)-f . -; in joint trial is not so
clear. One purpose certainly "\vas to expcdjte the adn1inistration of justice~ Hovrever~ it seen1s clear that the
legislature did not intend to limit a person charged \'{ith
a felony to any nurnber of perernptory chaJlcngcs short
of that set forth in 7iT30-1.5. rrlle lcgjslature in fact
granted the joint defendant extra challenges \vh1el! <~ould
be exercised separately, and of course if a joint defendant
could not agree tl1en he had the right to demand a separate trial. See page 10; Peo;)le r. O'Laughlin~ 3 Utah
133, 1 Pac. 653 ( 1882).
del~cndant.

could no longer den1and a separate trial~ it hecru n e po:;sible for section 77 -30~2 to produce a result contrary to the original legislative jrJtcnt
Such a result 1vas achieved in the instant case. The defendant failed to agree "·ith hls joint defendant, and thus
When t1te
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·~vas excl~d~d froin the

overat.'Lun of section 77-30-1:j a8 to
its snhjeet matter, and" could exercise only the two extra
perem"p_tor~es alloV,'ed under section 7"7-30-2.
rrhe "fact that the defendant ,\~as tried jointly h:; not a
reasonable differentiation as measured against the 6tandard of f3t"ale v. Llla.son.. The differentiation has noth]ng
to . do \vith the crin1e 1vith \vhich he 'vas charged.- The rle.
fe11dant had to make· his o"\vn defense, \vhich incidently
\vas antagonistic to that of his joint defendant If the end
res _u1t of the trial is adverse to the defend ant, then he 1\~ll
have to pay for th-e crirae personally ju~t the same as if
he llad been tried separately.
. .

.

The differentiation is unreasonable in vic'v of the
fact that th~ defendant cannot eontrol the c.1ass he is in.
That is, 'vhether he is included in the operation of section
/'7-30-1.~;

or excluded hy virtue (d. sPt·ljoll 't7·30·:.! has
nothing ·to do \vi th his O\vn intPI!t or pov.."'er. Of course
he e·an agree-but if the a(~t is construed as forcing his
·consent then it eeriainly diserhninates against ltim. ~i,he

tria..l

.~udgc

ca11 remove the defendant from the operation
c1f t:1ee1iu~i -~'7-30-2 hy granting a separate trial, but the
defendant has no right to den1and such action. The deputy COUJ1t)~- attorney ·,vho drafts the ~ffillplaint has" more
eoritrol over· the class i.it which the defendant \vill be
placed than any other person~· In fact in t~h; instant case~
one of the three persons in1plieated in the crime 'vas tried
separa t i,_~ l y ~ \\' h i_l e the defendant Bo\vne 'vas tried jointly
,vith anothe.1·.
The purpose of expcc.1iene.\- 1~1 of c.ourse, still present;
ho,vever, this is not. sufficient to justi [y the arbitrary· dit~
14
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ferentiation of the act set forth. Expediency must be
,reighed against our traditional guarantees of liberty ~d
justiee. It is the duty of the court to protect the. people
frout un·w·arranted inroads made in the guise of efficiency.
'·Ve rightly have many safeguards surrounding a perso~
accnsed of the crime of rnurder. Such an individual
~hould be tried \vith care. which correspo~ds with _the
awful responsibility of t~ng human life to aton~ for
crune.
+

}~vPn ~~ith

tllis purpose in mind it seems clear thal
the legislators, in ·part, followed the purpose behind sC(~
tion 77-80-16~ since they gave the defendants t\\ro extra
challenges~ At the time the act was passed, this meant
if the defendants agreed tl1cy 'vould get ten bet,veen them
and t\\~o each separately or a total . of fourteen. If . they
could not agree 1 then any· one of them could demand q
separate trial and secure the full ten perem pto IJ~ challenges. Thus the dominant purpose \vas still to give the
person charged jointly the benefit of any doubt. He
could not get Jess than the number provided in the
counterpart of section 77-30-15.

In contrast to the instant situation, it is interesting
to note that any challenge of uncon sti tuti onali ty bef or~

1933 \\·ould have to come from a defendant tried separately on the grounds that one tried jointly could

~ecure

additional perernptorles. Tn this situation the differen-

tiation would be reasonable 'vith the thought in nrind
that the joint defendant ,v·ould have to agree on the ten

challenges.
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Certainly the statute ill qu{_~~tion i~ itn reasonable and
arbitrary \vi thin the n1eaning of St.ute -r ..a! nso-n.. In the
in~~ a.n t (!.ase it produeed a res u1 t \\' hich denied the defendant of the equal protection of the la\vs. 1t i~ violative
of both the Constitution of l;tah and the Constitution
of the l~nited States.. Section 77-30-2 should be struck
do\vn as unconstitutional..
POINT IL

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
NOT GRANTING DEFE~DA~T'S 1\fOTION FOR A SEPARATE TRIAL.

lJ t(lh Code A ·n nl § 11"-:t l-6 ( 1.053) ~ provides that \.v hen
t \\·o or n1 o t·e del' end ants are ,jo i nll :: c.harged \v j th any
o ffcnsc they shall be tried j o ill Uy ~ "unless the court in its
discretion .
orders separate trials.'~ Se~ page 10. In
the instant ease the del'endant moved for a separate tria]
on tlu: ground, inter alia, that the defenses of the joint.
defendants \vere antagonistic (R~ 2G-29, 34 and 35).
1"~h:..~ trial judge denied this n1otion ( R~ :27- A)~ a1Jd 1n ~o
doing abused hi6 discretion.
I

I

Tl•e discretion entrusted to the court i~ a }1ulicial
oneJ and rnay not be exercised arbitrarily. See People
~~. L·-i·ndi~ay, ..f-l.~ IlL ~-72, 107 .:\'.E. ~d (1952); People v.
Ba-rba.to~ 395 Ilt 264, 69 N.E·. ~d fi92 (19-!H); People t.
Blaltnc, 363 IlL 551 J 2 :\J~:. ~d ~:-~9 (19:36); People t\
.t· 'i:-.:her, ~-f-9 X."'\'. -t 1H, 1G4 X .l 4 ~. ;~;~ ~) 1928). If the order
of the court U.ep t·tvcs the defendant of a fair trial, then
! !1( ~ judge ha~ a Lu~c·d l1i.s d i ~r·r~ ·t ion. See People r. Jf inU('f'(:t. :Ht! IlL :l4l J 200 ?\.1
853 (1936); ]:Jeople v. Lindsay~
supra.
{

1
:.
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Then~ is

littlE.· law in 1~tall concerning this question.
In the ~·aH<~ of Sto t(~ (. 1lf i1fe-r, 111 Lftah 25~), 177 P. :2d
7:27 { 1D-1-7), t.lu~ defendants vtere jointly tried for rape.
:\ 1notinn for separate trials 'vas made but no grounds
\V"ere :;(·1 forth.. Xo affidavit~ \\~Pre fil(·d, and the rer..ord
fn iled to ~liO\\' that nny oral statement \vas made giving
tltP l"Pa~OTl~ for the motion. rfhe l-:tah COUrt stated flS
follo\r~:

··The record of th ~~ (·fl~P, "\vhile it sho1vs tl1a1
counsel J'or appellant Jufldl~ motions for separatP
trials~ it also sho~'s that he did not 1nalu~ knovlr'n
anY r(:a~on for his rnot.i on. There "\\:rerc no affi ..
da~it~ filed a.nd the reeord fails to sho\v that nny
oral st nte1nent giving the reasons 1vas n1ade. Since
the appellant could not demand a ::;everance as a
matter of right it n1ust appear that the court had
before it trte fact~ \\'hich v,rould indicate that. the
appellant \\~ou ld be unduly prejudiced by a joint
trial before \Ve could hold that the tou r"i. had
ahtlf-iPd its discretion.~'

The l~tah r..ourt also decided the ca~e of /)fa.tr: t".
Burke, 10:! Ctah 249, 1~9 P. ~d 560 (194:2)~ "\Vhieh involved
joint defendnnt.s eharged \vith gaml1ling. The opinion
does not dl~(·losc \vhether any ~ufficient shov,-ring \VflS
made hr·J'ore the tr-ial judge in this case. The court held,
ho\vever ~ that no all use of d1 f.!(·rr~tl on was found s i nee the
evidence di:.;elo~{_\d the participation of both defendants in
a cnntiuu iuy operation \Yll iel• 'va~ part of a busines8.
The general rule is that separate trials should be
granted ,,~here the defenses of the defendants are shu\\'11.
to be an tagon is ti ('. 1t. 1f.; an abuse of discretion to deny n
1notion hrr~cd on th j ~ ground '\:rhen a sufficient sho"\\.•i ng
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is :made.- See l)eople v. BrauJie; 363 Ill. 551t 2 ::\+E, 2d
839 (1936); Peopl~ n. R(j.~·e.~ 348 IlL 214, 180 N.E. 791
( 1932); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E . 2d 692
(1946"); b"'fate ·r~ Livsey, 190 La . 474~ 182 So. 576 (1938) .

In People v. Bratf.'rte, ~upra, t\vo doctors were tried
jomtly for criminal abortion . Each n~oved for a separate
tria.I because of the antagonistic dcfen~c~+ The court
stated·· a.S follovls:
~'It

was apparent frorn the petitions that an
actual and s1l.bstantial hostility existed bet,vecn
the defendants over their lines of defense. Each
was protesting his innocence and condemning the
other. Each declared the other 'vould take the
'VI-ritness stand and testify to a state of facts wh1c.h
v,rould b.c e x-c.ul pator y of the Vii tness. and condem~
natory of his codefendant. Criminations and recrimi.nations were the inevitable result. OrdjTJuri13.r the right of one def end.ant to cross-ex.an1ine
his eodrn l'er1dant does not exist. l[o,vever, there
is an exception to the ruler based on justice and
necessity. '\\~here one defendant has given testiJnon y 'v hich tends to inc rimj nate the othe:r defendant, the latter~ e~peeia1ly \rhere he had no
p.riur noti~e of such incriminating testimony~ may
~ross-e;<anune the forn1er; but 've know uf no de~
cided case 1\ here such a situation har1 been brought
·· to the attention of the con rt prior to the trial and
a severanee w·a~ denied..''
7

In

trie.d

tln~

instaut ('ase,. one of the three

se})arateJ;.~.

defe~d~nts

v-ras

The ·defen!5es of tl1e t.\vo re1naining de-

-fendants "\~rere antagon~stic. C.ounsel for the defendant

Bovln·e filed· an affidav1t to t1le efrcct that he had person~
ally interviewed the other joint defendant, and that this
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~ le fendant assert(l( i a

fact ~it nation '". .hich was in~ons is ten t \vith the f:.t<·t~ ~<~ t forth l ~ \' Bo"\vne~ The affidavit al~o
statPd that there \vas continued discord and differenr.P of
opinion bet \\'PPn the attorneys for the respective defendant~ {R. 28 and 29)
I

"There \\'ere also affidavits filed by associates of
Bo\\~lle's attol'ney tc) the effect that on a specifie occasion
the attorney fol· J{.ivenhurgh had advi~ed that th~ defense
set forth hy his elien t ··\\·as the only defense in [the] case
and if [the~· J didn't go along \\rith him in that defense he
'vould ntake first degree Inurders of ,Jessie M. Garcia~
J r ~-- and Leonard ,.V. arner BoVt~ne.'~ ( R. 34 and 35) ~

Tll e joint def en dan ts \\'Ct\.; unable to agree even n~
to the exercise of their perernptory challenges (T\ 64 and
65 ). There Vr~as contin11al di6agreement throughout the
trial. Because of the fear ¥lhich the defendant Bo'\\'lle
held for his joint defendant, he in fact te~tified in an inconsi8tent rnanner ( ~f\ 711-818) ~ This carne as a comp]ete
surprise to his attorn(•y "~ho found it necessar~y to have
the defendant recant and tell the truth on redirect examination ( T ~ 8.:26-843) The effeet. on the jury of the
defendant's inconsistent statements '\\ras not good. This
prejudicial incident was the result. of the antagonisn1
bet'\-?een the t,,~o defendants.
I

The defendant claimed nothing as to the effect of the
amphetimine pill~~ Vlhile this \va~ the crux of Rivenburghts defense. The testimony of Dr. Clark ,\~as not
material as to Bo"\Vlle (R. 405 et seq.). Yet this testimony
was highly prejudicial, especial1y in vie\v of the long
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hyiJothetieal c{uustions \Vhich were propounded hy the
State (R. 418-423). These questions \Vere inaccurate in
that they incorporated the test of sanity rather than
•nerely consider1Tlg tlte difference bet\veen first. and
seeond degree nturder~ They 1vere Lased on many facts
\\o~hich 'vere not in evidence, and 'vere objected to on thjs
ground (R~ 417). ~~·he questions .advanced all of the points
\Vhiclt the State \vas attelnpt.ing to prove and amounted
to a sun1mation in the 1niddle or the State's case. The ill
effect of this testimony could have been avojded in a
~c·parate trial, for it 'vas the direct result of the ineon~
sistent defenses of the t'vo joint defendants.
Rivenburgh continued to take pills even during the
triaL At one point it became obvious to 1nan·y present in
the court room that Rivenburgh 1vas groggy (T" 906)" A
n1otion to disntiss on behalf of Bo,\·ne hall been argued
and denied~ The jury had been 1n ~ t r·uc.ted, and ~tunma
tion8 \\.~c:re about to beg i11. .l{.i ven burgh'~ condition was
di~cussed in thatnlh':!'S ( T~ 800) on :F~riday, and a Te'!e~~
,\-as eall.ed until the nPxt Monday in order that R.1vel11nlrgh \voald be n1entally present at all stages of the
proccc.~( i ing. .H~veryone having lrno,vledge of the t5 i tua t.ion
\Y[I.~ a~hnonished and ordered to n1aintain seer(~e.y (T.
906)~

It is difficult to

assPs~

the effeet of this j nc.ident
upon the jul·)·~ The jurors all had an opportunity to
observe Riven burgh on Friday. They ·w·ere all present to
notice the conrusion of n1any different persons entering
and leaving tlle judge's chambers~ In spite of the adnton1t ion, 1nan,\~ !'UJnors 'vere about The ne\vspapers i.Jnplied
20
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that the reason for the delay 'vas the defendant\~ motion

to

di~1ni :-\~~

consideration is that the jury ~ras instructed
before ti1L~ inrident on _lPriday~ and did not receive the
ea~t~ for deliberation until the follo"\ving )Jonday, three
da)·::; later. The rather complierr1 (~d and tec.hni(·fll instruct tuu~ 1nust. have been quite rentote in their 1n1nd~ at Hlat
tiilH\ This intt(lt~nt had a prejudicial effect on the de~
fl·ndant Bu\\?Jle "\Yh ieh eonld have bc~n avoided in a sepa/\ no1 her

ratL\ trial.

i\. grc~nt. deal of testimony, inadmis~ible a~ to t.he de~
fenda.nt, eanle into evidence as app1icahle to Rivenburgh.
Rivenburgh had converRations ~'it}l the deeedent before
entL\ring the attic (R.. 4H~) and again "\~·hi1c in the attic
t R~ ~~,11) He ~poke \Vi t.h Dalton as he ca.1nc do,\o·n from
the ;d t1(• ( R. 513). Rivenburgh'R conversations \V1th
Dripps relative to standing point (R. :t13), his state1nent
t( • Stark t} at there ''""a.f.;. a dead rnan in thr: a ttir, ( R .. 3()()),
the incident bet.,vecn the decedent and Stark jn t.hP prP.senee of Rivenburgh \VII<._~n the decedent expressed fpar
th:tt he \vould be killed (R. 37 4 ), the conversat ]on~ \vit.h
\\~nod~ concerning the boot8 ( R~ 4-57) anrl \vith .l~andcl
and Ijandrun1 relative to alibi~ (I~-~ ~-68, 46;\ 3.11d 466) ~
all \\"Cl"e p rc.judicial to the dcfendan t BO\VTIC. rrh 18 prejudi(•e could ha,Te been avoided by separ·atc trial~.
+

1

1,~hether

error 'vas cln1111n itted mu~t be made in the light of tl~e faets \\~hich \Vere before t h L t r in1 judge a 1 the time of the 1no l ion.. In State
C. JJ if!cr 1 S!lfH"a, this (~OlU"t said:
The determination as to
1
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"Hov{ever the prc~ent case i~ decided upon
the question of abuse of discretion \Vhich arisr.s~
jf at allr at tl1e time of the ruling upon the motion
for separate trials4 It is not decided upon th ~
question of prejudieial error, assuming a proper
motion.~'
..

Bee .also People v4 Lindsay, 412 Ilt 4-72, 107 N.E. 2d 614

{1952).

-

In People r. l•·is!u?r, 2-1-9 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E4 336
(1928), the appellate eourt took a rctro~pective vieVt,. of
the trial in deter1nining \\' hether error had been comrnitted. In this connection the N e\\' York court stated;
'' ['V{ e look to the tccord of the trial to determine if it] reveal[s] injusti{~e or in1pairment of
substantial rights rmseen at the beginning. In a
ease \vhere~ 1vithout the existence of a confession
by one defendant, the evidence against another
"rould be too \veak to justify a conviction or even
where a conviction "\vonld be doubtful, our revievr
of the judgment 'vould compel us to conclude that
an abuse of discretion had been committed.~'

If the determination is Inade on the basis of the circumstnnees present and before the judge at the time the
motion 1vas made, there is error. The affidavits (R. 28~
29~ 34, and 35) and the ol'"al argument ('vhich \Vas not included in the record) certainly indicated that the defenses
of the t'ro defendants 'vere antagonistic.
If the determination is made on the basis of the entire record, the trial judge\~ order is equally erronous.
~,he defendants could not agree as to i he exercise of their
peremptories, and thus the defendant Bowne could exerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cise only t'vo such challenges~ See page 8 ; see also
T. 64 and 65. The threats of the defendant Rivenburgh
<~attsed the defendant Bo,vne to be inconsist-ent in setting
forth his version of the facts (T. 711-818, 826-843). The
defendant Rivenburgh, in effect, confessed durjng the
trial virtually admitting all of the facts set forth by the
state ·(R~ 513; T. 552, 553, 604-613). lie relied on the
use of drugs as his defense. This de rens e ~ras inconsistent to that of the defendant Bowne and prejudicial
testimony, \vhich otherwise v.lould not have been entered,
came in.. All of these incidents, together 'vith the long
and mysterious recess which "'"'as called to allo'v Riven~
burgh to recover fro1n his drugged condition, were tJ~e
result of the trial judge's error in denying the defendant's motion for a separate triaL

It might be argued that any B.Jlta.gonism bet,ven the
joint defendants cou1d be overcome by proper adnlonitions or instruetions to the jury v.rhich would protect
the interests of the joint defendants~ Such reasoning is
false. In People V~ Bra.une, 363 111 551, 2 NrE. 2d S3R
(1936), the trial judge did not hold the petitions ins u i' fi ~
cient to set forth antagonism, but rather inclieated that
the interests of the defendants could be protected.. ~he
court on appeal thought otherwise and so ruled.
In People 1.\ Barbaro, 395 IH. 264t 69 N.I~~r. 2d 69~,
696 {1946), the court tnade the f ollo·w·ing s ta ten1ents :

·· . . . but the instruction could not cure the
damage already done. Only theoretically did the
instruction \Vithdra w the {_~Vidence from the consideration of the jn ry. The prejudicial effect in~
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evitably rernained. 17pon the rceord 1nade, separation of the admissible {~V iden r-e fro1n the ~nadmiss
ible becornes ahnost in1possible----even fo1· a t~ourt
of rev.ie,v . ''
See also People r. F·i._~,·her, 2+0 X . Y . 419, 164 N.E. 336, 341
(1928) (dissent) ; People L\ 11'a-rgo, 149 ~lise. 4Gl, :268
N.Y.S~ 400 ( 1.933).
As 've have already mentioned, one result of the antagoni8m in ih e instant case ,,~a~ to deny the def en dan t the
full nmnber of peren1ptory clu1llenges he "\vould othenvise
ex eteise. Such a result is certainly an element to be considered in det~.rrnining 'vhether error "\\ras conrrnitted
by the trial j udgc.. See Ca-rroll -~_.-·. ~.).,lal e_t .1.39 Fla. 233, 190
So~ 4B7 (1H39); j,_,Jeade v. ~.)lo.).f'~ 85 So. :Jd ()13 (~,la.1956)
(question involved C.OIISolida iion of t\vo charges against
<HI~.~ de fen dan t) ; People ·v.. l v· a. rgo, 149 1\1 isc. 461 ~ 2 GS
N.Y.S~ 400 ( 1933).

"\Vhether or not the trial judge has abused his discre~
tion in refusing to grant a separate trial is a problen1
11eculiar to each case~ Vrhetl1L·r fairness demands a separate trial cannot be decided by any rule-of-thumb.. Sec
People ·t/~ F·L··du;-r, 249 N~1.... 419, lf)-t- N.E. 336 (1928) j 27
...~ustralian L.J. 238 (lH53).

In People c~ Wa·rgoj 149 hli~c~ 461 ~ 2()S 1\" .l"".S. 400
( 1933), a defendant cl1a1·ge< r \vi th nl urder moved for a
separat.(~ triaL In considering the motion, the court ,~-as
concerned 1vith tl1e folhn\'ing elemeni"B,: (1) The defensl\~
of the t'vo defendants \\·~ re antagonistic. ( 2) The moving
defendant did not actually partiripate in the killing but
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:1ided and abetted the other defendant. (:~) The other
dPfendant had confessed. ( ~) rl,he di Htr·ict attorney had
indicated that he t 11 ig h t call the other defendant (it iR not
clear l1 n \V he "\Yould be able to do this). ( 5) The diffieu1t.y
oi" instructing the jury as to the admissibility of evide!lce
\va~ recognized. ( 6) ThP court also \Vas tnindful that,
~ .. [ H] po u a joint. trial either defendant might easil~y-, in his
01" l~t~r 0\Vll interest, deprive the Other Of all rig-lt t. to perl"'lllptOl"y challenge.~'

The court in the TV.ltrgo case gran ted the In oti on for
a separate triaL In so doing the judge ~tated as follo\vs:
~~Even

though there 1nay be basis ["or the contention that no one of these reason~ i~ suffieient~
;.~et in the aggreg.ate they control the di s(·rction
of a trial judge 1rvho8e pra~~t.ieal ex pL~rient~ ha~
\\·ttne~sed their soundness. They mini1nil'ie to alIno~t nothing the popular demand for greater
~peed~ econoJn~·, and convenience in the adtnini6tration of the la\v at the sacrifice of justice to the
individual.. The trial of pett~y eases in the Snptente Court [a trial court in Xe1v York] can very
w·cll j/ield sufficient tj •ne for separate trials in a
proper ease such as this \vhieh ntust be classed aR
the 11tost important of all Htigationt:: bcrause upon
it~ outco1ue is dependent the guaranteed and inalienable right of human life."
In the instant case each of the grounds which 've
have discussed have on other oeeasiOTIS been deemed h.Y
other courts sufficient to find an abuse of discretion.
Certainly all of the6e elernents vic"tvud in the aggregate
as Wargo suggest Po, indicate a.n abu~c of discre~ ion.
The only \vay in ,\~hich tl1e defendant could havP been
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insured of a fair trial, was the granting of a separate
one.

In rnaking his deciHion, the trial judge was forced
to \Veigh the interest of the co1nrnunity in speedy ~!J-d in~
expensive administration against our traditional guarantees oi liberty and justice. Certainly \Ve should not sacrifice the rights of the individu~l for a little added effi~
ciency. rrhe 'vords of Justice Lehman in People v.l~~.;.. .'her,
249 N.Y . 419, 164 N .E~ 337 (1928) (dissent), are applicable to the jnstant case. lie stated as folio\\-~~:
'~X o

considerations of expen6e to the 8tate,
inconvenience to wi tr1e~~ :sL.. s and publje authorities,
or even of delay in punishn1ent of the guilty can
justify a proeodure which result~ in serious impairrnent of the rightH Of an accused to fair consideration by an hnpartial jury of the competent
testirnony produced against him.

a

t'\Ve secure greater speed, economy, and convenience in the administration of tlle lav-r,. at the
price of fundamental prineipleH of constitutional
l ibert;~. That price is too high. Our ideal is that
jus tl <.~t~ should be s1vi f t and certain~ Hum an just ice is still far f'rou1 that ideal ; and sometimes I
feel that a proper zeal to destroy technicalities
and achieve a more efficient administration of
justice leads us to disregard fundamental principles and guarantees . ''

In the int-:tant caHe the d-efendant

'"a~ denied a

fair
trial. This could have been prevented Inerely by granting
a separate trial. In

vie"~

of the c ri1• 1e \Y it h \,- hich the de-

fendant \va H charged, and the a \Vf ul punishn1ent which is
26
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pr<.~~<·r1bed

for that (·rhne; and in vh~,,- of the grounds
'vith \rh ich he n1oved, and the un ['air tr·ial \vhich he was
al·.tnally subjected to, a separate trial lnost certainly
:-:.llould have been granted~ The failure to so order 'vas
clearly an abu.sP. of discretion on the part of the trial
judge.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT~S MOTION TO DISMISS SIN·CE THE JURY

COULD NOT HAVE FOUND
DOUBT THAT THE
DER.

BEYO~D

OEFENDA~T

A REASONABLE

\VAS GUILTY OF 1\:lUR-

In Instruction No. 8 the trial judge instructed the
jury as follows :

Hlf the evidence in the case i~ suscoptible of
t.\vo construeti ons or jnterpretat.i on s each of which
appears to you to be reaRonabJc and one of \vhich
points to the guilt of the defendant and the other
to his innocence,. it is your duty_, under the la\v., f.o
adopt that interpretation which admits of the defendant. 's innocence and reject that 1\'hich points
to his guilt."
That this is a proper instruction in Utah cannot be doubted. In State r~ I.JaufJ, 102 T;tah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942),

this Court. stated as

folloVt-~s:

". . . the prosecution still has the burden of
proving beyond a rea~onable doubt that the de~
fend ant is guilty. Or stated another "\\~ay, thG
prosecution must 'not only sho~T •
that. the
alleged ra r.t~ and circumstances are true, but they
must also be sueh facts and cireu1n~tances that
are incompatible upon any reasonable hypothPsi~~
r
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lvith the innoeence of the accused, and ineapablc
of explanation upon any rca~onable hypothe~i~
other than the defendant\;; ~ui I L ... ~all the r1 rcumstances af.; proved mur.=t be eonsistent \vith each
other~ and they arc to 1Je taken together as proved.
I~eing con8istent "-,..ith each other and taken to~
gether Un~.\- IllUSt point ~l1l'Cly and unerrjngly in
the diree.t ion of guilt.~
''llPnceJ if t\vo reasonable hypothesiR at·{·
pointed out by ihc evidence and one of tl1e1n points
to tl1c defendant'f.! lnno-cen(~0 1 it 1vould then he difficu1 t. l n :-;ee ll O\V any jury r.oul d he convinr.ed l H_~.
yond a reasonal.1lf.l doubt of the defenrlant's guilt.''

SeP. ai~o Stale -c+ A ndt'rson~ lOK "Ctah 130t 158 P. 2d
.I :2"7 (1945); /3tale r+ T-1-u.-rch~ 100 t•tah ~-1-t, 115 P.2d 911
(1941) ; State F~ (/ro~cfo-rd, 59 l·tah :-;9~ ~Ol Pa(·+ 1030
( 1921) ; People r. S co It, 10 l ~ tah ~ 1"7 7 ;3 7 P a. e. :)B 5 ( 1894) j
State 1j. A' rivin.~ 101 1~ tal• 3G~lr 1~0 P . 2d 285, B02 (1941).
IT the evidence indicates a reasonable h:vpothcsis as
to j nnote1H:e, the case should not be allo\ved to go to the
jury. If the facts relied on by the StatP. are not inconsistent \vlth defendant'~ innocence, the innocence of the defendant i:-1 c~stabli~ ~ 1ed a~ a 1natter of laVt See State ·r .
..J ude-r . :·aJJ-~.j t:;Upt.a; Stu! e r. Er~rin, supra .
7

•

The State relied on the fae.t that Rivenburgh before
entr-ri11g the attic disclosed a plan to kill the de_cedent.
The decedent "~ct.~ killed in the attie and defendant ·was
there at the time~
P'"rhe def~ndant adn1its tJ1a1 he heard 1-"ti.vcLrdJu q . ~h dis(· lose a plan l o kill~ hut~ Hke 1lh" ~tate's \\·itn<.\~~e~~ did not
be11eve Jiivenln1rgh \\·n~ sPriou:-;~ Bo\\~ne thought, H~ did
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the ~ t.at~~·.~ 'vi t.ne~~e~.. t. hat l { iven bu r·p:h \vas going to the
attie to co1nmit sodomy.
It i8 rcn.=..·o1u1J)le to believe that Bo•Nne tl~ought. Rivenbnr~h \\·a~ no1

going to kill the decedent but instead \vn.s
going to cun11 u it HOdo1ny h~(·.a use of the follov"ing fact~ :

X eith(_~r the defendant nor the State's 'vitnesse~
thought Rivenburgh ''ras .-:;eriouH when he disc1osed a plan
to kilJ. e.g. :
1~

{a) Dripps was told by Rivenburgh to stand point
for sodo1ny ( R. 333). He 'vas not concerned \vhcn he
heard tltP scream (R. 351), and did not think there had
been a death.

(h) Stark did not tlrink the decedent would be killed
in spHe of' ,d1at he said as he "\Vas entering the attic. (R.

;r;-+).
(c) Rivenburgh did not tell "\lloods of an intent
kill anyone \vhen he borrovled his bootR (R. 4;)7) ~

~'"or

to

(d) Dripps told l{aslnussen to stand point but not
rnurder (R. 332 and 334)4

(e) Randel heard Riven h11rgh and the deeedent talk
of the decedent's sex .ael ivitil·~ in tltc. attic the afternoon
of the preceding day (R. 494 and 495). He heard Bo\'t'~ne
~a~~ he ,v·ould have no part of killi11g the decedent ( r-r. 231

and .:2-H-i). Buw11e told Randel he \Vas in the attic to sl and
point for sodomy, and that he did not kno\v there "\vould
be a killing (R. 269 ). J{;andel ~aid Bov~:rne 'vas framed (1{..
29
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249 and 290). Rivenburgh· laughed 'vhen Randel said he
'vonld have no part of the killing of the decedent .( rp~ 575).
Randel
never
told the guards of any plan to kill the de.
. .
cedent bec.ause lle did ·not think Rivenburgh was serious
.- .: .: . ._ . ~
( T . ').:-14) .
~•.

(f) Dalton heard that" Rivenburgh was going to the
attic to engage in sodomy..(R. 319.and 827). ·
·-

(g) Rivenburgh talked to the decedent about going
to the attic for sodomy {R. 498). lie first got the intent
to kill th-e decedent 'vhile in the attic (R. 511)4 He had
no intent to have Bo~11e aid, abet or assist in killing the
decedent (T . 6.:1-2)4 Rivenburgh had no knowledge as to
the State's contention that Bo,vne had a SQ.issor lock on
the decedent's head ( 1\ 644, and 645 ).
(h) Garcia knew of no plan to kilL He was told
to stand point for sodomy (R.. 503)4
(i) Bowne did not think Rivenburgh was serious
when he talked about killing the decedent (R. 267-278,296,
297~ 497; T~ 691 and 692). He V~~a~ later told to go to the
attic ~ith Garcia to stand point for sodomy (R. 269, 270,
319, 503; T. 253, 584-586, 684 and 694).
...
2. It \vas cornrnon at the Prison
kill others (R . 255).
~3.

to hear ·of plans to

It '\\ RS comrnon to ll ear of threats to other in7

1nates (R. 276 and 278).
4~

l t. 'vas comn1o n to stand point in the attic and

el~ev,~J 1P r·t~

for sodomy ( R. 279) .
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~,~
s(~(l

It ,,.af.i co Inmon to <"flrry knivf•s In tlte Prison.

pagt ··L
I

G.

It was common to practice sodomy at the Prison.

:--iPe l'a.ge 4.

7.. The use of Amphetarnine pills v.ras common at
t.he Prison. At 6:30 p.m., Rivenburgh \vas high on pills,
and he talked about killing the decedent. No one thought
hitn serious because of previous plans, threats, and ''big
talk" induced by the pills.

S. Other inmates who were witnesses for the State
and who knew of Rivenburgh~s Hplan,." stood point, destroyed evidence and ,ioined in alibis; yet they were
charged 'vit h nothing . 'rhey could not receive inununity
for turning state's evidence~ Immunity can on_ly be af~
forded a defenda-nt and that requires court approvaL
f/tah Code .A.nn~ § 77-81~7 (1953). The reason they were
not charged along V. ith the defendantsj as as~erted by
thl~ prosreuting attorney's office, was because the~y had
no intent or kno\vledge that the deeedent \vas going to be
killed . rrhe reason they had no intent 'vas because they
did not think Rivenburgh v.las t::erious. There is no reason
\v hy l~o,vne should have thought 11 i ni serious~ It is ·reason.able to believe Bo\vne "'U8 there to stand pqint for
7

sodomy .
l~~ven

if 1t i ~ reasonable to believe that a plan

"\Va8

effected: it is also reasonable to believe tl1at Bowne 'vas
jn the att1c to stand point for sodomyr l!:ven if the facts

relied on hy the State are consistent 'vitl1 the defendanes
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guilt~ they do

uot '".

~

. exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the existence of such fact ... " State r.

An{le·rso·n1 108 l~tah 1.30, 158 P.2d 127 (1945).
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO+ 15 IS CONFUSING AND IN ERROR BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SEPARATE rrlfB CRIME OF SOD011Y FROJl THE CRIThlE OF
1\.ICRDER, AND IN ITS ABSTRA·CT FORI\f COCLD ALLOW
THE JL~RY TO FIND ITHE DEFENDA~T GUILTY OF
:\-lURDER IF THEY BELIEVED liE AIDED AND ABETTED
I~ THE ACT OF SODO~lY+

lnstruct.i on 1\ o. l~) is the trial court's instructjon on
'~aiding and abcttingH ( R-. 151 and 15~). It would not
be objectionabl c if it 'vere not for the fact that in the
instant case tnore than one cr1rne was involved . l1uch
of the testin1ony introduced in vo1ved tl1e crime of sodomy
(T. 251, ~52, 609, and 610). 'l~hi8 crime \vas inextricably
connected "With the fact si tnation. Sodomy~ the crime
again~t nature, is capable of engendering deap seated
prejudic.es against anyone connected with itr Indeed it
mut='t have been dilficult for the jury in the instant case
to appreciate the fact that no one 'vas being prosecuted
for this act of perversion~ In vie\v of tlli8, it \vas error
for the court to instruct as in Tnstruction X O~ 15.

In Instruction No. 15, the court fails to ~pecify 'vhich
crhne it is speaking of. T·he Instruction read~ in part
as follov.-,.s : '~ \'" ou are instructed that all person3 conee rned in t.h e cotnmi s.si on of a cr i-1 ~ ~ e, 'vhe th er they d j ref tly comtnit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet
irJ its <:otrnnission~ are principals in any cri1n e so com-
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nutted.~~ {Emphasis

added)· (R. 151). 'Vhen read in the
cMtex.t. of the evidence~ the court literally seems to tell
the jury that if the defendant \vas concerned in the com1n1~~ion of "a crhne~~ (the crinte of sodomy perhaps), then
he i~ a principal in '~any crime" so coJnmitted (the crin1e

of murder included).
The defendant vlas charged only 'vith murder. It
,\~a~ error not to 8pecil"y 'vhich c.rirno the jUTJT 'vas to consider. The defendant adrrritted his part in the crime of
~odotny. This, in fact, \vas his defense to the crime of
murder. 1 et in Instruction No. 15, the trial .]udge failed
to f;pr.ei t•y which crime th{_~ aiding and abetting of \Vould
rende1· the defendant guilty. 'l1 he jury, \vhile still under
the impact of a sordid story of sexual perversion, vtas
free ~ o consider the defendant's part in the sexual activities as acts capable of rendering hi Ill guilty on the
charge of 1nnrder. If the jury chose to follov,' this in~
~truction, the l'act that the defendant t::tood point (lookout) for an act of sodomy 'vas sufficient to rnakc hi1n a
p ri nci pa1 in the c.rhne of tn11rder.

This Court ha.s exr•ressed it Rei [ o_n rnany occaRions
In regard to the l1Se of abstract in~tructjont5~ See State v.
Tho1n p.~rnl, 110

l~ tah 113~

1 70 P. ~rl

t;):~

( 1946), and cases

cited therein. Instruction X o. 15 is needle~ sly abstraet
in failing

to substitute the term "1nurder,, for the gen-

eral term . ~crime . '' In vie\v of t }t(.~ peru I iar
ea sP~ the ~hoek i ng and highly

far.t.~

of thjs

distasteful facts involving

~odon1y,

the failure of the trial court to indicate that it
\vas the aiding and abetting of n1urder and only· mnrde r
33
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"'""hich 1vould make the d:ef endant a principal in the crime
c-harged \vas great1y ·prejudiciaL
~rhe

prejudicial · nature· ·of this instructio.n \~,..as not
cured bv... a corrP(t state•nent of .the law elsewhere
in the.
.
.•

instructi~ns.

See Soda ·V. ~!ar-~i~o-tt, 118 Cal .. App. ~35,
5 ~--~d 67;)~ 677 {1~}31 )~ rr~li_s rule is especially tr_u~ in._a
c:.r in1i:p.al case v..There. the .crinte ella rged is punishaple l)y
deatli.
The trial. judge
·in his. i.nstruetions
should take
.
.
.
.
"s pee.ial care to remove any lna terial \\'hi c"h is erronous
or unnecessarily abstract and ·thus p rej uilieial to the defendant.
POINT V.

THE TRIAL COCRT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 26 IS IN
ERROR SINCE IT FAILS TO RESTRICT THE JURY TO A
CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMISSIONS AND STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE TRIAL TO EACH
RESPECTIVE PARTY .

·In Instrur.tion No. 26 the trial court instructed the
jury as follo,vs:
· "You must arrive at your decision .sole1y from
the evidence sub1ni.tted to you during the trial,
and the natural inferences which n1ay be reasonably d ra'vn therefrorn, together 'vith the admissions and stip1tlati·o n s of the parties durmg the
trial . .. ..'' ( fJ1n phasis a.d d ed.) (R.. 1.64).
-

.

The trial judge erred in not 'restricting the adtni8~
sions of a party to that part~y. Certai.nl~~ the admissions
of one joint defendant ·cannot bind another. The error
j s intensified if we ]nterpret the ternt ''party" to mean
~~plain tiff" and ''defendant. !t' This is illustrative of the
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rn j ~r }1 l PI' \\' hir.h a rl ~P.~ ,vJten f\VO

t o~PthPr in an improper

ea~e.

uef end antS arP. tried

See page 16.

trial~

the judge has the i1nportant responsibilitY... to t·r~~t rict evidence admissible on 1.y as to one of tla~
defendants to lhat defendant. This is the only ,\-a!·· in
In a joint

\\' hich the other defendant r..an be ·saved from p rejud i (~r~.
:\~

've pointed out in the argument to l 31 oi.nt IJ, the theory

i ~ that any prejudice is retnoved by an admonition or in~t

uet ion to the jury to forget what they have hP:a rd in

I'

regard to a certain defendant. See page 23. "\Vhile this
i~

'voefully inadequate and not realistic, it is certainly

better than the instruction
r\ o.

~(}invites

lui~~ ion~

and

V{e

no'v excGpt to . Instruction

and commands the jury to consider the ad~tipulations

of thll

narti~R

in R.nv 'vay it seeg

fit
The defendant Rivenburgh. in effect confessed during-

the trial (R. 513; T. 55:2<1 553, 604-613). The jury properly
could consider his ad1nissions only as against hint. Sueh
admissions '"ere prGjudicial to the defendant B ov,rne
merel~· be~ause of their presenr.e in the trial. These adrui~::;;ion~ should have been considered only as against
the defendant Rivenburgh. The trial judge improperly
instructed the jury to conHider "the adrnissions and stipu~
lations of the parties during the trial" and .did not restrict that consideration to the respective par·ty 'A'ho
made the admission~
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POINT VL
THE TRIAL .JUDGE ERRED IN REFL1 SING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT~S REQUESTED I~STRUCTION NO. 13.
Defendant~ requested in~truction No. 1:3 reads a.~

f ollo"\\,..S:
"You are instructed that if after a consideration of all of the evidenfP you conclude that it is
reasonab1e to believe that tlu~ defendant Leonard
''rarner Bruw·ne in1<~nded to stand point ·while
defendant ~I.ar.k Jl ertill Riven berg ( sje) and the
deceased Leroy .J n~epr1 \"!"erner mutually engag-ed
in an act of f.;ndorny, and did not !nt.rnd to be a
participant in an act of 1nurder, you should find
the dcfcndan t Leonard \Varner Bo\\lJle ~·K ot
(}ui l t;r. ~' (R.. 59).
'thi~

in substance vlas defendant's defense~ He 'vent to

tlle attic to function as a lookout during an act of perver-

sion. H c did not intend to kill, or to do great bodily harm

to the decedent or anyone else. Ht· \\~a~ not a-.,vare of anv*'
plan or intent on behalf of Rivenburghr If the jury
thought it reasonable to believe the defendant~ then cer~

tain! y he \ras not guilty of Inurde r in the first degree .

Defendant had a right to have the jury
as in }L i~

.reque~ted in~truction ~. . o.

to hin1 not to
Thi~

hav(~

in~trnc.ted

13. It -.;..vas prejudicial

his theo1·y of defense before the jury.

is especially so in viev..,.. of the instruction the court

did g-ive in t.h e fonn of
1:l~). See page

Inf.;trur~ t i ou

No. 15 ( R. 151 and

32~
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POINT VII.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A N!:\V TRIAL.
~\ ne\v trial

ing

should have been granted for the follo\\}'~

r(·a~ons:

1.

...\~su1uing that the trial judge did not abuse his

discretion in failing to grant the motion for .scpa1·ate
trial~~ a ne-\v trial should have been granted after the
trial hp(·ause of the prejudice ,vhic.h developed during tlte
trial. s~~~ . argun1ent for l )oint II, page 1ft

'2. The jury \vas separated during its deliberations
in that o~e bailiff took six juror~ at. a time do,vn an elevator for pu rpo~es of going to the r·e~t room. This was
brougl1t to t.l1e attention of the court.
3.

After ntany hours of deliberation, the C.Oltrt. in~trnel Pd the bailiff to adtnonish the jurors they 'vould
be taken to a hotel fu [' the n lght.. rrhe fol'eman told the
baili l'f that t hu ju1'y \Yn~ deadloeked~ ~\ t that n1oment,
another juror askc·d for an additional fifteen minute~ delihPration before leaving for the hotel. The jurors 1vere
left to (.h.) liberate . In ten minutes, at about 3:00 a.m.aftpr approximatel~,c nine ho11rs deljberation-they returned 'Yith a verdict of guilty beyond a l'easonahle dou.ht
(T~ 103G) ~ Thi8 indicate~ l hL~ verdict \vas reae.hed by
means other than a fair •:xpre~~ion or opiuion h)- all the
JUrors.
I

The court erred in permitting the prosecuti.on
to c.all tT es~iP Garcia to the \r [tnes~ st.and4 Garcia \\·a~ a
-t.
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co-defendunt to be tried. separately at a later date (R.
480)~ Counsel
for Bowne wa~ also counsel for Gareia.
.
.
1"\Then advised that the P~?seeutor intended to call G.arcia
as a ·w·itness, counsel for Bo\vne and Garcia infortned
~he.prosecution that he would not permit Garcia to testify
in the Bo"\\'ll e trial (1-L 476) The rosecu tio:o. still ea11ed
Garcia a.s a 'vitness i·n. the pretN~Hce of the jury (R.. 475).
Tl1~ jury 'vas exrused · while 1a,,~ \vas argued and Garcia
r.efuged to te~t.ify on 'thG g·roundH of self-incrimination.
(R. 477 -479).
4

p

~";-hen tl~~

j.ury returned, the court admonished the
j nry a~ to 'vhy Garcia did not testify ( R. 480). ~rhe
prosecution knev.r that Garcia would refuse, but called
him ~nyv~·ay in. an effort to pr~judice the jury. The jury
pro~ahly thought that Bo,vne and Rivenburgh v-."'ere guiltf
since Bo"'~nc, R.Jven burgh and Garcia v.rere all charged
\\:lth the sanle killing and Gareia V{Ould incrjminate hiin~
self hy testifying in the Bov.:ne~R.ivenburgh trial. The
tnisconduct of the prosecutor \vas beyond the lirnits of
propriPty and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 477).

G. Rivenburgh \Vas questioned on direct examina~
tion by hi~ counsel; he \Vas cross~exan1ined by the prosecuti~n. qn matters touched on. direct. l!pon completion of
the prosecution ~ cross- exaniina ti on~ Rivenburgh "'"a~
rro~i-;-exan1ined by counsel for I!O\\:rne on matters t?uched
on direr.t and adver~~ to the interests of I~o,vne .. Befor~
counsel ror Ilivenburgh \va~ IK~l·Jnitted to examine on redirect~ the eourt permitted the prosecut1 on to crossexrunine Rivenburgh on matt2I'.S touched on crosst

exainination by counsel for BO\\lle (T. 647 et

38

seq.)~
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'Thr. procedure \Yns objt~et f~d to l1y counsel for Bo"\\~e
on t h~· grounds that t t·o~s-exainiuation tnust be lintited to
!nattPr~ touched on direct-examination and not permitted
a8 to 1uatters touched on cross-examination (even though
the cross-exantination \\-'as by counsel for a co-defendant)
(1T. (i-t7 and 650) ~
The c.ourt erred in permitting the crus 8- exa1n i n.fl / ion.
on the cro.~.)'·ffU nrtno ti u n) and ah:o, prejudic.ed the d~
fendant by affording the prosecution undue repetition in
having tv.ro cro ss-examin ati ons.

6.. Xo motive \vas asserted or shown as far as
Bovlne "'~as concerned. 'Phe absence of any proof as to
motive tend~ to indicate innocence. See Peopl(j r. Torn
lVoo, 181 CaL. 315, 184 Pac. 389 ( 1919)4 )\There reliance 1s
placed entirely on circun1stantia1 evidence to establish
a crime:t absence of motive is a circun1stance tending to
clear the accused. See Slater v. State~ ~2-t- Ind . G27, 70
K. E. 2.d -J-:25 (19-:1- 7). Presence or absence ot' rnotive is not
proof of a substantive faet, though its absenee strengthens the presumption of innocence~ See Tho·inas u. G'~onnn ..~
lS~ \-a~ 2(j;>, 46 S . E. 2d 388 (1948).
POINT VIII.
TIIE. J'rRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO. COI\fPEL
THE PROSECUTION TO FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS
AND COPIES OF STATEI\IENTS )lADE BY WITNES'SES
A~D

DEFENDANTS.

·The Prosecution \\-as .permitted~ while examining '\vitne.~~es and defendants at trial, to refer to notes, content~
oi tape recordings and statements tal{en during the
~tate ·s investigation of the facts.
39
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·1,he full content~ of such documents should have
been afforded counsel for -the defendant as argued in l1i~
~.'fotion For· Production of Docu1nents (R. 24 and 25).
The prosecution had the ufair advantage of quoting
''rord~ out of context.. This jeopardized counsel for the
de i'endant in his cross~examination and re~direct. Qunting \von.1~ out of context is especially rmfair and prejudicial in the instant case because of the great an1ount
0 f" Ci rc Ulll Stantial evidence.
In his cross-exmnination, the prosecution \Vas in a
po8ition to in1press the jury that evecy"ihing he stated
¥/as contained in the note~, tape recordings or staternents, "\''lhen in fact it might never have been~ Because
the 1rvi tn e:i s eoul d not ren1 ernber everything that '\\""as ~a 1d
at a definite ti.rne and place nta11y 1nontl1s prior to trial,
it \Vas iin plied t}la t he \VaS faJ SC]y testifying. rrhj S COUld
have been cured by refreshing the witness's memory on
re-direct. Without the proper documents, support 'vas
irnpossi bJ c.

An unfair and prejudicial advantage was afforded
the prosecution hy the error committed by the trial court
in failing to compel the production of documents as requPst.ed in defendant's n1otion (R. ~4, 25~ and .27 -A).
POINT IX ..

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED \VHEN IT REFUSED TO
AD~IIT EVIDENCE CO~CERNING THE ~CHARACTER AND
REPUTATIO~ OF THE DECEASED.
A~ a

general rule, the character and reputation of
the dceeased is inadn1issible as being immaterial. Ho1rv~
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e\·~~r,

it \Yas propPr evidence in the in~tant case for the
purpose of showing 1hnt it \vas reasonable to believe the
dE·(·Pdent \va~ willingly going to the at1 ic to practice soda~
1ny 'vit lt Rivenburgh.

Defendant <~.nntend8 he \Vas to Htand point in the
attic while the der..edent and Rivenburgh engaged in
,,odoniv.
The State contends he wa~ there for rnurder4
...
( \Ht~ i~ t r·n t \vith t l ~e theory of other I'Casonable hypothP~i~, evidenee of the rharaeter and reputation of the
clp,·pased 8hould have been admitted to show the defendant'~ conten1 ion 'vas reasonable. The trial court erred in
refusing to ad tnit evidence of the decedent's character
arui reputation for this purpose.
COXCI~USION

The defendant BovlnP }tas been denied the due
process of lalr and the equal protection of the Ja,v~ \\··hich
i~ guaranteed by our Constitutions. H.c has been deprived
of a fair trial before an impartial jury . The evidenee in
this case did not warrant submission to the juiJT on the
question of JJurder in the First Degree, and the defend~
ant~s conviction o~~ surh charge is not ~ubst.antiated by
the evidence~ The trial and verdict eon~titute a miRcarriage of justice and should be revers cd.

Respectfully submitted,
H1\N~LX _-\.~D

l\1 TljTJEl~
(7ounsel for A ppPllrnJ.f Bo1c-ne
-1-10 Empire Building
Salt Lake {"1ity, l~tah
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